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Abstrat: Bohmian mehanis is an alternative interpretation of quantum me-
hanis. We outline the main harateristis of its non-relativisti formulation. Most
notably it does provide a simple solution to the infamous measurement problem of
quantum mehanis. Presumably the most ommon objetion against Bohmian me-
hanis is based on its non-loality and its apparent onit with relativity and quan-
tum eld theory. However, several models for a quantum eld theoretial generaliza-
tion do exist. We give a non-tehnial aount of some of these models.
Keywords: Bohmian me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1 Introdution
This note reviews Bohmian mehanis, an alternative interpretation (or modi-
ation) of quantum mehanis. Bohmian mehanis reprodues all preditions
of quantum mehanis but introdues a radially dierent pereption of the un-
derlying proesses. Like most alternative interpretations it is not distinguishable
from standard quantum mehanis by e.g. any experimentum ruis.
We start out by a few historial remarks in Se. 2 before we outline the main
harateristis of its non-relativisti formulation in Se. 3. Here we put speial
emphasis on the status of observables other than position. However, the most
important feature of the theory is its solution to the infamous measurement prob-
lem of quantum mehanis (see Se. 3.3).
We then turn to the question of relativisti and quantum eld theoretial general-
izations of the theory. Several suh generalizations do exist and in Se. 4 we give
a non-tehnial aount of some of these models. We also address the question
of what it atually means to generalize a theory and make a little digression to
the eld of intertheory relations.
However, before we get started, we would like to make some general remarks
onerning the interpretation of quantum mehanis. These may help to put the
debate on Bohmian mehanis into a wider ontext.
1.1 Reetions on the interpretation of quantum mehanis
The interpretation of quantum mehanis has been disussed ad nauseam and the
engagement with it an be a frustrating and disappointing business. This subjet
matter ontinues to produe an endless stream of publiations
1
and nobody an
reasonably expet this issue to be settled in the future. So muh the worse, the
dierent amps stand in ere opposition and one gets the impression that this
is an other obstale for reahing substantial progress.
However, what do we atually mean by progress? Perhaps, in a situation like
this, we need to reonsider our riteria and standards for progress and suess.
Given that the foundation of quantum mehanis has a smooth transition to
philosophy we may learn something from a similar debate there.
Chapter 15 of Bertrand Russell's little book The Problems of Philosophy (1912)
is titled The Value of Philosophy and starts with a remark whih applies just as
well to the interpretation of quantum mehanis:
[W℄hat is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It
is the more neessary to onsider this question, in view of the fat that
many men, under the inuene of siene or of pratial aairs, are
inlined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innoent
but useless triing, hair-splitting distintions, and ontroversies on
matters onerning whih knowledge is impossible.
And indeed, many pratially minded physiists regard the interpretation of quan-
tum mehanis as pointless sine no diret appliations follow from it.
Russell ontinues, that although philosophy does aim at knowledge whih gives
unity and system to the body of the sienes, it admittedly had little suess in
this respet and ould only answer very few of its questions denitely. However,
more important than the answers are the questions it asks:
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any denite answers
to its questions sine no denite answers an, as a rule, be known to
be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; beause
these questions enlarge our oneption of what is possible, enrih our
intelletual imagination and diminish the dogmati assurane whih
loses the mind against speulation (...)
Now, rated by this measure, the debate on the interpretation of quantum mehan-
is is a story of spetaular suess indeed. Agreed, only few questions have been
settled ultimately, but every alternative interpretation enlarges our oneption
1
(Cabello, 2004) gives a bibliographi guide to the foundation of quantum mehanis (and
quantum information) and ollets more than 10
5
entries.
2
of what is possible.
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And this is exatly what Bohmian mehanis does as well.
It enrihes our oneption of what the quantum world may be.
2 Some history
Bohmian mehanis was rst developed by Louis de Broglie! Therefore we will
use the name deBroglie-Bohm theory in the remainder of this paper. Some
basi onepts of the theory were already antiipated in de Broglie's dissertation
in 1924 and his talk on the 5th Solvay meeting in Otober 1927 ontained an
almost omplete exposition of the theory  alled the pilot wave theory (théorie
de l'onde pilote) by him (Baiagaluppi/Valentini, 2006). For reasons whih are
not entirely laried yet the theory fell into oblivion until David Bohm developed
it independently in 1951 (Bohm, 1952). However, the reeption of this work was
unfriendly, to say the least. See e.g. Myrvold (2003) for the early objetions
against the deBroglie-Bohm theory.
Sine the 70s John Bell was one of the very few prominent physiists who stood up
for the theory. Many papers in his anthology (Bell, 2004) use the deBroglie-Bohm
theory and the stohasti ollapse model by Ghirardi/Rimini/Weber (1986) as an
illustration of how to overome the oneptual problems of quantum theory. The
deBroglie-Bohm theory is even losely related to Bell's most important disovery,
the Bell inequality. It was the non-loality of the deBroglie-Bohm theory whih
inspired him to develop this result.
Interestingly, during the 60s and most of the 70s even Bohm himself had only
little interest in his theory. Only sine the late 70s he and his group (B. Hi-
ley, Ch. Dewdney, P. Holland, A. Kyprianidis, Ch. Philippidis and others) at
Birkbek College in London started to work on that eld again. They referred
to the theory as ontologial or ausal interpretation of quantum mehanis.
Sine the 1990th some new groups and researhers joined the eld (D. Dürr, S.
Goldstein and N. Zanghi, A. Valentini, G. Grübl and others) and it ame to the
formation of dierent shools. Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi (1992) oined the term
Bohmian mehanis whih stands for a spei reading of the theory. While
mathematially equivalent to Bohm's exposition in 1952, it is inuened by Bell's
(and also de Broglie's) presentation of the theory (e.g. it puts no emphasis on
the quantum potential
3
).
Researhers who want to stay away from this debate (or who entertain their own
sub-variant) are usually identied by alling the theory deBroglie-Bohm theory,
de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave model or any similar permutation of the key words.
2
The above-mentioned should not be misoneived as a liense for arbitrary speulations.
The possible answers still have to ome under srutiny.
3
It should be noted that while all of the before mentioned Bohm students use the quantum
potential formulation, the presentation of the theory in Bohm/Hiley (1993) and Holland (1993)
shows dierenes nevertheless. In addition hanged also Bohm's own interpretation of the
theory in the ourse of time. However, this is learly not unusual and by no means spei to
the deBroglie-Bohm theory. We just mention this point here to all into attention that  given
these dierent readings of the theory  talking about the deBroglie-Bohm theory may need
further qualiation.
3
3 The non-relativisti formulation
The key idea of the (non-relativisti) deBroglie-Bohm theory (de Broglie, 1927;
Bohm, 1952) is to desribe a physial system not by the wavefuntion, ψ, alone
but by the ouple of wavefuntion and onguration, i.e. the position, Qi, of the
orresponding objets (e.g. eletrons, atoms, or even marosopi entities).
ψ → (ψ,Qi)
quantum mehanis → deBroglie-Bohm theory
The theory is now dened by three postulates whih will be explained in the
following
4
:
1. The wavefuntion satises the usual Shrödinger equation
ih
∂ψ
∂t
= Hψ
2. The partile veloities (a real vetor eld on onguration spae) are given
by the so-alled guidane equation:
dQk
dt
=
∇kS(Q(t))
mk
(1)
WithQ(t) = (Q1(t), · · · , QN(t)) the onguration of the system, mk denotes
the mass of partile k, ∇k is the nabla operator applied to its oordinates
and S the phase of the wavefuntion in the polar representation ψ = Re
i
h¯
S
.
3. The position-distribution, ρ, of an ensemble of systems whih are desribed
by the wavefuntion, ψ, is given by ρ = |ψ|2. This postulate is alled the
quantum equilibrium hypothesis.
Postulate 1 shows that ordinary quantummehanis is embedded in the deBroglie-
Bohm theory and that everything whih is known about solutions of the Shrödinger
equation remains valid and important. The deBroglie-Bohm theory is sometimes
alled a hidden variable theory sine it supplements quantum mehanis with
additional variables, i.e. the partile positions. However, this terminology is a
bit awkward sine the positions are not really hidden.
Postulate 2 equips the partiles with a dynami whih depends on the wavefun-
tion. Metaphorially speaking the quantum partiles are riding on (or guided
by) the ψ-eld.Thus the partiles are moving on ontinuous trajetories and pos-
sess a well dened position at every instant. The proof for global existene of the
Bohmian trajetories is given by Berndl et al. (1995a) and was later extended by
Teufel/Tumulka (2005).
4
More detailed expositions of the deBroglie-Bohm theory an be found in Holland (1993);
Bohm/Hiley (1993); Cushing (1994); Dürr (2001); Passon (2004a); Goldstein (2006).
4
The form of the guidane equation an be easily motivated.
5
One may take the
lassial relation between veloity (v), urrent (j) and density (ρ):
v =
j
ρ
(2)
and inserts the quantum mehanial probability urrent, j, and the probability
density ρ:
j =
h¯
2mki
[ψ∗(∇kψ)− (∇kψ
∗)ψ]
ρ = |ψ|2 .
A dierent motivation of the guidane equation  based on symmetry arguments
 is given in Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi (1992).
The above equation applies only to spinless partiles. However, the generalization
to fermions (or arbitrary spin) is straightforward. One only needs to onsider
solutions of the Pauli equation (ψ1, ψ2)
t
and arrives at the guidane equation 2
with the modied urrent:
j =
∑
a
(
h¯
2mi
(ψ∗a∇ψa − ψa∇ψ
∗
a)−
e
mc
Aψ∗aψa
)
Postulate 3 is needed for the deBroglie-Bohm theory to reprodue all predi-
tions of quantum mehanis. The ontinuity equation of quantum mehanis
(
∂|ψ|2
∂t
+ ∇
(
|ψ|2 · ∇S
m
)
= 0) ensures that any system will stay |ψ|2 distributed if
the quantum equilibrium hypothesis holds initially. The quantum equilibrium
hypothesis provides the initial onditions for the guidane equation whih make
the deBroglie-Bohm theory to obey Born's rule in terms of position distributions.
Sine all measurements an be expressed in terms of position (e.g. pointer posi-
tions) this amounts to full aordane with all preditions of ordinary quantum
mehanis.
Further more, the quantum equilibrium hypothesis ensures that the deBroglie-
Bohm theory does not allow for an experimental violation of Heisenberg's uner-
tainty priniple notwithstanding the well dened position the partiles possess in
priniple (Valentini, 1991).
However, while it is ensured that the quantum equilibrium hypothesis is satised
for a onguration whih is |ψ|2 distributed one, it is by no means lear why
any onguration should be aordingly distributed initially. At rst this seems
like a very spei requirement whih needs e.g. very speial initial ondition of
the universe. If the problem is viewed this way, it would be more appealing to
have a dynamial mehanism whih explains why ρ 6= |ψ|2 distributed systems
evolve into a quantum-equilibrium distributed onguration. This approah is
explored in Valentini (1991); Valentini (1992) who laims that the dynamis of
the deBroglie-Bohm theory gives rise to a relaxation into an approximate (i.e.
5
However, its form is not unique. One an add an arbitrary divergene-free vetor-eld and
arrive at the same statistial preditions (Deotto/Ghirardi, 1998).
5
oarse grained) equilibrium distribution for an enlarged set of initial ongu-
rations. However, there exists a more onvining approah to justify the quan-
tum equilibrium hypothesis. Work by Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi (1992) shows, that
the quantum equilibrium hypothesis follows by the law of large numbers from
the assumption that the initial onguration of the universe is typial for the
|Ψ|2 distribution (with Ψ being the wavefuntion of the universe). This deriva-
tion resembles the way Maxwell's veloity distribution for a lassial gas follows
from the typiality of the phase-spae onguration of the orresponding gas
(Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi, 2004). Aording to this view the quantum equilibrium
hypothesis is no postulate of the deBroglie-Bohm theory but an be derived from
it.
6
3.1 A remark on the quantum potential
While the above presentation introdued the guidane equation as fundamental,
the original work of Bohm (1952) (and later also e.g. Holland (1993) introdued
the notion of a quantum potential. For the phase of the wavefuntion the
following equation holds:
−
∂S
∂t
=
(∇S)2
2m
+ V −
h2∇2R
2mR
. (3)
Due to the similarity with the lassial Hamilton-Jaobi equation (for the ation
S) the term ∝ h¯2 has been baptized quantum potential. Within the Hamilton-
Jaobi theory the partile veloity is onstraint to m ·v = ∇S, whih orresponds
to the guidane equation of the deBroglie-Bohm theory. If one adopts the quan-
tum potential formulation the motion along the Bohmian trajetories an be
thought of as taking plae under the ation of a novel quantum-fore.
However, the guidane equation an be motivated e.g. by symmetry arguments
(Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi, 1992) and needs no reourse to the Hamilton-Jaobi
theory. Moreover, in Goldstein (1996) it is argued that the quantum potential
formulation is misleading sine it suggests that the deBroglie-Bohm theory is
just lassial mehanis with an additional potential (or fore) term. But the
deBroglie-Bohm theory is a rst-order theory (i.e. the veloity is onstrained
by the position already) and this important trait is disguised in the quantum
potential formulation.
Whether this ambiguity in the formulation of the deBroglie-Bohm theory should
be viewed as a substantial debate or a seondary matter depends on the ontext.
These two readings of the theory have ertainly a great deal in ommon and
in omparing the de Broglie-Bohm approah with standard quantum mehanis
the distintion between these dierent shools is usually irrelevant. However,
more detailed disussions whih involve subtleties regarding e.g. the status of the
wavefuntion or partile properties have to pay attention to these dierenes.
6
At the risk of being impreise we gave only a short sketh of the dierent strategies to
motivate the quantum equilibrium hypothesis. For details the reader is referred to the original
literature.
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3.2 Charateristi features
After the denition of the theory we want to disuss some of its harateristi
features and try to put them into the wider ontext.
Determinism
The deBroglie-Bohm theory is deterministi sine the wavefuntion and the on-
guration at a given time x the time evolution of the system uniquely. However,
given the quantum equilibrium hypothesis the preditive power of the theory is
not enlarged ompared to ordinary quantum mehanis. All preditions of the
theory remain probabilisti but in ontrast to ordinary quantum mehanis, the
randomness is arising from averaging over ignorane.
However, it should be noted that to many adherents of the deBroglie-Bohm the-
ory, determinism is not the key feature of the theory. For example Bohm/Vigier (1954)
have developed a hidden variable model whih ontains a stohasti bakground-
eld and in a later setion we will disuss a eld-theoretial generalization of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory whih also ontains stohasti eets. Moreover do many
Bohmians appreiate the GRW model whih inludes a stohasti term into the
Shrödinger equation to desribe the wavefuntion ollapse. Short but to the
point: not the indeterminism of quantum mehanis but rather its vague aount
of the measurement proess reated disomfort with the ordinary formulation and
inspired the development of these alternative models.
Complementarity dispensable
Many quantum phenomena (e.g. interferene eets) need both, the wave and
partile aspet of matter for their explanation. The notion of omplementarity
was developed as an attempt to justify this ommon use of mutually ontraditory
onepts. Within the deBroglie-Bohm theory matter is desribed by a wave-like
quantity (the wavefuntion) and a partile-like quantity (the position). Hene,
the notion of omplementarity is not needed.
Non-loality
Sine the wavefuntion is dened on the onguration spae, the guidane equa-
tion of a N -partile system links the motion of every partile to the positions of
the other partiles at the same time. In priniple the partiles an inuene eah
other over arbitrary distanes. However, this non-loality is needed in order to
explain the violation of Bell's inequality. Moreover ensures the quantum equi-
librium hypothesis that the orrelation of spae-like separated partiles an not
be used for faster than light ommuniation (Valentini, 1991). Finally does the
non-loality of the deBroglie-Bohm theory vanishes if the state is not entangled.
Whether this non-loality is viewed as an unaeptable feature depends on the
attitude towards the problem of non-loality in quantum mehanis in general.
Following the work of Bell and the experimental onrmation of quantum me-
hanis in tests of the Bell inequality it beame widely aepted that quantum
7
mehanis itself is non-loal. However, the preise meaning of the term non-
loal is far from being unique and their exists a vast literature on that topi.
A thorough disussion of that issue is far beyond the sope of the present paper
(see e.g. Cushing/MMullins (1987)). However, one an reasonably state, that
the non-loality of the deBroglie-Bohm theory is more expliit (i.e. dynamial)
than the non-separability of ordinary quantum mehanis.
Be that as it may, given that the deBroglie-Bohm theory is a reformulation of
non-relativisti quantum mehanis, any ation-at-a-distane should be no threat
anyway. It is turned into an objetion against the theory if one argues that no
Bohm-like relativisti or quantum eld theoretial generalization of the theory
an be given. In Se. 4 we will disuss the existing models for suh generalizations.
Measurements deserve no speial role
The main merit of the deBroglie-Bohm theory is its solution to the measurement
problem. This theory treats measurements like any other interations or exper-
iments. This allows a reply to the frequent omplaint that the trajetories of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory violate the rule Entia non sunt multiplianda praeter
neessitatem whih is usually attributed to William of Okham (Okham's ra-
zor). While the trajetories are additional entities indeed, any measurement
postulate or the like beomes unneessary. Given the importane of this point
we devote Setion 3.3 to a more detailed disussion of the measurement-problem
and how it is solved by the deBroglie-Bohm theory.
Observables other than position and ontextuality
Muh more important than being deterministi or having partile trajetories is
the novelty of the deBroglie-Bohm theory with regard to the status of observ-
ables other than position. Within ordinary quantum mehanis the identiation
of observables with linear Hilbert spae operators is usually regarded as the key
innovation. Their non-ommutativity is believed to be the mathematial embod-
iment of the deep epistemologial lesson quantum mehanis teahes us.
The deBroglie-Bohm theory takes a dierent route. First, it inludes the partile
positions (whih are desribed by real oordinates, and not by some operator) into
the state desription. Seond, it distinguishes these variables, i.e. the outome
of every experiment is determined by the wavefuntion and the onguration.
Note, that this holds also for experiments whih are supposed to measure quan-
tities like energy, angular momentum, spin et. There are no hidden variables
or ontinuous funtions whih orrespond to the atual values of these quanti-
ties
7
. Within the deBroglie-Bohm theory all these quantities do have a dierent
7
In fat, Holland (1993) p. 91, introdues loal expetation values for these quantities
whih are supposed to orrespond to their atual value along the trajetories. Averaged over
the quantum equilibrium distribution these loal expetation values reprodue the quantum
mehanial preditions. However, one might objet that these properties are redundant sine
the position is already enough to reprodue all experimental preditions of quantum mehanis.
Further more they are not onserved along the Bohmian trajetories.
8
ontologial status than position. Dürr et al. write (using spin as an example
only):
Unlike position, spin is not primitive, i.e., no atual disrete degree
of freedom, analogous to the atual positions of the partiles, added
to the state desription in order to deal with partiles with spin.
Roughly speaking, spin ismerely in the wave funtion. (Dürr et al. (1996),
p.11)
In ommon jargon these properties are alled ontextual, i.e. the measurement
does not reveal a pre-existing value of a system-property but depends ruially
on the experimental arrangement (the ontext).
8
Thus, in general, measurements do not measure anything in the loser meaning
of the term. The only exeption being of ourse position measurements, and, in
some sense momentum-measurements. The latter do indeed measure the asymp-
toti (Bohmian) veloities. Hene, the only properties of a Bohmian partile
are its position and its veloity. Just as ψ is no lassial eld, the Bohmian par-
tiles are no lassial partiles, i.e. they are no bearers of properties other than
position. Therefore a physial objet like e.g. an eletron should not be onfused
with the Bohmian partile at position Qi. It is represented by the pair (ψ,Qi).
Agreed, this is a radial departure from the lassial partile onept. However,
within the deBroglie-Bohm theory this move is not only natural (reall that e.g.
momentum and energy are onepts whih arise in 2nd order Newtonian mehan-
is while the guidane equation of the deBroglie-Bohm theory is 1st order) but
allows for an elegant irumvention of the Kohen-Speker no-go theorem, di-
reted against hidden variable theories (see e.g. Mermin (1990). This theorem
demonstrates, that a onsistent assignment of possessed values to all observables
for a quantum mehanial state is not possible. However, if you allow for on-
textuality  as the deBroglie-Bohm theory does  you do not expet suh an
assignment to exist at all.
Aording to Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi (2004) the naive realism about operators,
i.e. the identiation of operators with properties and the ommon talk about
measuring operators, is the soure of most of the onfusion in the interpretation
of quantum mehanis. However, given what we have said above, it may appear
puzzling why operators an play suh a prominent role in the usual formulation
of quantum mehanis and how exatly they relate to the Bohmian formulation.
In Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi (2004) it is shown how operators naturally arise in the
deBroglie-Bohm theory. They are derived quantities whih are oding the proba-
bility distributions for ertain measurement-like (p.11) experiments. This leads
us to the next setion whih is devoted to a disussion of how the deBroglie-Bohm
theory treats measurements and in partiular how it solves the measurement
problem.
8
In Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi (2004), p.64, it is argued that the term ontextual property
is atually misleading beause it suggests that e.g. spin is still a property. But properties
whih are merely ontextual are no properties at all (Dürr/Goldstein/Zanghi (2004), p.67).
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3.3 How the deBroglie-Bohm theory solves the measure-
ment problem
Let us rst briey reall the measurement problem of quantum mehanis. It
an be stated in several ways, e.g. Maudlin (1995), p.7, oers the following
formulation:
9
The following three laims are mutually inonsistent:
A The wave-funtion of a system is omplete, i.e. the wave-funtion
speies (diretly or indiretly) all of the physial properties of a sys-
tem.
B The wave-funtion always evolves in aord with a linear dynamial
equation (e.g. the Shrödinger equation).
C Measurements of, e.g. the spin of an eletron always (or at least
usually) have determinate outomes [...℄
The argument runs like this: Given a two-valued observable S with eigenvetors
ψ1 and ψ2. Let Φ0 denote its wavefuntion in the ready-state and Φ1 (Φ2) the
state of the apparatus if the measurement yields ψ1 (ψ2). Hene, Uˆ(ψi ⊗ Φ0) =
ψi ⊗ Φi (i ∈ {1, 2}) holds, with Uˆ the time evolution of the ombined system. A
general state will be a superposition:
ψ = c1ψ1 + c2ψ2
Now, given B, the ation of Uˆ on this state yields:
Uˆ(ψ ⊗ Φ0) = c1ψ1 ⊗ Φ1 + c2ψ2 ⊗ Φ2 (4)
While individual measurements always result in either the state Φ1 or Φ2, this
is a superposition of dierent pointer states. Thus, in ontrast to our experiene
quantum mehanis does not leave the joint objet-apparatus system in a de-
nite state.
10
Aording to assumption A the wave-funtion should speify every
physial fat about the measurement devie. Maudlin argues that, sine the two
Φi enter symmetrially, it is not lear by what argument one ould attempt to
show that the nal state 4 represents one but not the other indiator state. Thus,
assuming A and B ontradits C. Any resolution of this problem has to deny at
least one of the above assumptions.
To deny proposition A needs some sort of hidden (or atually additional) vari-
ables. The deBroglie-Bohm theory is a prominent example for this strategy and
9
In fat, Maudlin (1995) introdues three slightly dierent formulations of the measurement
problem. We refer only to the rst formulation (hene, Maudlin labels the following propositions
1.A, 1.B and 1.C).
10
Our argument relied on simplifying assumption like an ideal measurement and pure states
for both, objet and apparatus. One might suspet that the problem is only generated by
these unrealisti onditions. However, even in the ompletely general ase employing density
operators (i.e. mixed states), non-ideal measurements, interations with the environment et.pp.
the onlusion remains essentially unaltered (see Bassi/Ghirardi (2000) and Grübl (2003)).
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we explain how this solves the measurement problem further below. Ballentine's
statistial or ensemble interpretation (Ballentine, 1970) an also be onstrued as
a denial of proposition A. It takes the quantum state to be the desription of the
statistial properties of an ensemble of identially prepared objets only.
To deny proposition B leads to so-alled ollapse theories whih abandon the
strit linear time evolution of the system. For example Ghirardi/Rimini/Weber (1986)
have developed suh a non-linear model whih desribes this mehanism. Also
does von Neumann's proposal of a ollapse of the wavefuntion fall into this
ategory. However, von Neumann (like all other standard presentations of quan-
tum mehanis) did not speify the physial onditions under whih the linear
evolution fails.
Finally one may question C and the many-world interpretation an be onstrued
as a solution of the measurement problem along this line.
Eetive ollapse in the deBroglie-Bohm theory
Now we turn in more detail to the deBroglie-Bohm theory and its resolution of
the measurement problem. It denies assumption A from the previous setion, i.e.
introdues the partile position as additional variables to arrive at a omplete
state desription. However, what is needed are not just additional variables but
variables whih supply the neessary means to distinguish dierent measurement
outomes.
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Quantum mehanis desribes how a superposition state evolves into a sum of
marosopi distint (i.e. non-overlapping) states, i.e. (ψ1 ⊗ Φ1) · (ψ2 ⊗ Φ2) ≈ 0.
It just fails to distinguish the branh whih orresponds to the atual measure-
ment outome. Within the deBroglie-Bohm theory the dierent measurement
outomes orrespond to dierent ongurations (e.g. pointer positions). The
positions provide a reord of the measurement outome, or more generally they
yield an image of the everyday lassial world (Bell (2001), p.41).
Suppose for example that the measurement yields outome 1, i.e. the initial po-
sition of the Bohm partile was suh that the deterministi evolution developed
into a onguration that lies within the support of ψ1 ⊗Φ1. The Bohm partiles
will be guided by this state beause the non-overlapping ψ2 ⊗Φ2-part is dynam-
ially irrelevant. Thus the deBroglie-Bohm theory provides a so-alled eetive
ollapse of the wavefuntion. Given the quantum equilibrium hypothesis the
probability for this eetive ollapse obeys Born's rule.
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Maudlin (1995), p.11, notes that therefore additional variables whih would be really
hidden (i.e. unobservable) would not help at all.
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4 Relativisti and quantum eld theoretial gen-
eralizations
Presumably the most ommon objetion
12
against the deBroglie-Bohm theory is
based on its non-loality and its apparent onit with relativity and quantum
eld theory. However, several Bohm-like models for relativisti quantum me-
hanis and quantum eld theory do exist. Here we give a non-tehnial aount
of some of these models. But before doing so, we need to say a few words on the
atual meaning of Bohm-like.
4.1 What is a Bohm-like theory?
At rst sight Bohm-like seems to mean having trajetories or even having
deterministi trajetories. Obviously this requirement is intended to apture the
spirit of the deBroglie-Bohm theory. The task of developing e.g. a Bohm-like
quantum eld theory is then to reonile this onept with the preditions of
QFT.
This may even be possible (see for example the Bell-type models below), however,
on loser inspetion this requirement seems to be too narrow nevertheless. One
only needs to onsider the history of physis, where many important features of
a given theory did not arry over to its generalization. In partiular does QFT
provides examples for the departure from onepts whih were aepted in non-
relativisti quantum mehanis. Or to put it dierently: one should expet (or at
least not exlude from the outset) new onepts to enter a theory if it is extended
to new areas.
Another more reasonable demand for a quantum eld theoretial generalization
of the deBroglie-Bohm theory is that it (i) reprodues the preditions of QFT
and (ii) inludes the non-relativisti formulation as a limiting ase. The last
requirement seems neessary to regard a model as a generalization. In Se.4.4 we
will ome bak to this important question.
However, the existing models for Bohm-like QFT onentrate on still another
feature of the deBroglie-Bohm theory. They suggest, that the essene of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory is its lear ontology, i.e. that it attributes being to
ertain entities. In ommon jargon, the theory possesses beables. This term was
oined by Bell (1976) and is meant in ontrast to observable i.e. emphasizes that
any observation (i.e. measurement) deserves no speial role in the formulation of
a fundamental theory. In Bell's own words:
In partiular we will exlude the notion of observable in favor of that
of beable. The beables of the theory are those elements whih might
orrespond to elements of reality, to things whih exist. [...℄ Indeed
observation and observers must be made out of beables. (Bell (1986),
p.174)
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A omprehensive disussion of objetions against the deBroglie-Bohm theory an be found
in Passon (2004b)
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The beables of the non-relativisti deBroglie-Bohm theory happen to be partiles
(a good question is whether the wavefuntion ψ should be regarded as a beable
likewise. Bell regarded the state-vetor as a beable, although not a loal one
(Bell (1986), p.176)) whih move on ontinuous trajetories. In what follows
we will also ome aross eld-beables and indeterministi dynamis in Bohm-
like theories. As long as this beables provide the means to reord measurement
outomes they an be used to build a Bohm-like model.
4.2 The Bohm-Dira theory
We begin with the question of a relativisti generalization. Already in Bohm (1953)
an extension of the deBroglie-Bohm theory to the Dira equation was given. The
strategy here is analogous to the non-relativisti ase. Solutions of the Dira
equation fulll a ontinuity equation with a time-like urrent. The spatial part
of this urrent reads ψ†αkψ. In addition the density ρ = ψ
†ψ (the appropri-
ate quantum equilibrium distribution) is positive denite. Thus, similar to the
non-relativisti ase a partile veloity an be dened by the ratio of these two
quantities:
dQk
dt
=
ψ†αkψ
ψ†ψ
(5)
with: αik = 1⊗ · · · ⊗ α
i ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1 and: αi =
(
0 σi
σi 0
)
In this way the desription is omplemented by the onguration, i.e. the beables
of this theory are partiles as in the non-relativisti formulation.
However, in the many-partile ase this theory is not Lorentz ovariant sine
it uses a ommon time for all partiles. The frame-of-referene in whih ρ =
ψ†ψ holds is distinguished (Berndl et al., 1995b). But this non-ovariane is only
relevant on the level of individual partiles. The statistial preditions of the
Bohm-Dira theory are the same as for the usual Dira theory beause (i) by
onstrution it is ensured that they hold in the distinguished frame and (ii) they
transform properly under Lorentz transformations. Hene, the preferred frame-
of-referene an not be identied experimentally.
In fat, as shown by Dürr et al. (1999), it is even possible to formally restore
Lorentz invariane for the Bohm-Dira theory by introduing additional struture.
Dürr et al. introdue a preferred sliing of spae-time, determined by a Lorentz
invariant law.
In order to deal with anti-partiles one might invoke the Dira-sea onept, i.e.
introdue partile beables for every negative energy state (Bohm/Hiley (1993),
p.276).
Other approahes to develop a relativisti deBroglie-Bohm theory use the onept
of the multi-time wavefuntion ψ(q1, t1, · · · , qN , tN), i.e. introdue a dierent time
variable for eah partile. However, the resulting set of oupled Dira equations
an only be solved in the absene of interation potentials. See Tumulka (2006)
and the referenes therein for a more detailed disussion of these models.
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However, it is generally agreed that the uniation of quantum mehanis and
relativity needs a quantum eld theoretial framework anyway. We therefore
turn to the eld theoretial generalizations of the deBroglie-Bohm theory. Here
several ompeting models do exist.
4.3 Quantum eld theoretial generalizations
We have learned in Se. 4.1, that the beable is the deisive quantity in a Bohm-like
theory. Hene, the dierent models for a quantum eld theoretial generalization
of the deBroglie-Bohm theory an be lassied aording to the beables they
employ. Roughly the models fall into the following three ategories:
Field-beables for bosons and partile beables for fermions
Already in his seminal paper in 1952 Bohm presented a way of generalizing his
ausal interpretation to the eletromagneti eld. The additional variables (or
beables) were not partiles but elds. The quantum state is thereby a wavefun-
tional whih guides the eld beable. This approah an be extended to the various
bosoni elds (see e.g. Bohm/Hiley (1984); Holland (1993); Kaloyerou (1996).
For example the seond-quantized real Klein-Gordon eld is desribed by a wave-
funtional Ψ(φ(x), t), whih satises the Shrödinger equation:
i
∂Ψ
∂t
=
∫
d3x
(
−
δ2
δφ2
+ (∇φ)2
)
Ψ. (6)
The orresponding guidane equation for the eld beable φ(x, t) reads
∂φ
∂t
=
δS
δφ
, (7)
where S is the phase of the wavefuntional Ψ.
In these models the onguration spae is the innite dimensional spae of eld
ongurations. Sine there does not exist a Lebesgue volume measure on these
spaes the rigorous denitions of an equivariant measure, i.e. the analogue of
|ψ(q)|2dq, is problemati (Tumulka (2006), p.12).
For fermioni quantum elds Bohm et al. argue that a ausal interpretation in
terms of eld beables annot be onstruted (Bohm/Hiley/Kaloyerou, 1987) and
(Bohm/Hiley (1993), p.276). Instead Bohm and Hiley propose to introdue par-
tile beables for fermions aording to the Bohm-Dira theory mentioned above.
In fat, models by Holland and Valentini whih try to provide eld-beables for
fermions did not sueed (Struyve/Westman (2006), p.1).
Field-beables for bosons and no beable-status for fermions
Inspired by the diulties to onstrut a Bohm-like theory for fermions with eld-
beables, Struyve/Westman (2006) propose a dierent diretion. They reall that
e.g. the property spin an be desribed in the deBroglie-Bohm theory without
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assigning a beable status to it. They suggest, that the same may be done for the
fermioni degrees of freedom. Sine fermions are always gauge-oupled to bosoni
elds it is suient to introdue beables for the bosons.
Tehnially their work is similar to Bohm's model with eld-beables for bosons
mentioned above. They introdue a spei representation for the bosoni eld-
operators and trae out the fermioni degrees of freedom. Their beables are
the transversal part of the vetor potential. In Struyve/Westman (2006) this
approah is arried out for QED, but it has a natural extension to other gauge
theories.
Struyve and Westman disuss in detail how this model aounts for an eetive
ollapse, i.e. how the total wavefuntional evolves to a superposition of non-
overlapping wavefuntionals. However, one might still worry if this model is
apable to ontain a reord of the measurement outome, for example in terms
of pointer positions. They reply to this onern, that
(...) if we ontinue our quantum desription of the experiment, the
diretion of the marosopi needle will get orrelated with the radia-
tion that is sattered o (or thermally emitted from, et.) the needle.
Beause these states of radiation will be marosopially distint they
will be non-overlapping in the onguration spae of elds and hene
the outome of the experiment will be reorded in the eld beables of
the radiation.(p.18)
We now turn to an approah whih an be viewed as omplementary to the
Struyve-Westman model. While their model views fermions as an epiphenomenon,
the Bell model we are going to disus next an be seen as traing out the bosoni
degrees of freedom (Struyve/Westman (2006), p.8).
Partile beables for fermions
Bell (1986) presented a model for Hamiltonian quantum eld theories with the
fermion number as beable. He regarded this to be a natural generalization of the
partile onept, sine
The distribution of fermion number in the world ertainly inludes
the positions of instruments, instrument pointers, ink on paper, ...
and muh muh more. (p. 175)
Hene, to assign beable status to this quantity ensures a solution of the mea-
surement problem.
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This model is formulated on a spatial lattie with points
enumerated by l = 1, 2, · · · , L (the time remains ontinuous). For eah lattie
site a fermion number operator is dened with eigenvalues F (l) = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 4N
(N being the number of Dira elds).
The fermion number onguration at eah time is thus the list n(t) = (F (1), · · · , F (L)).
While the non-relativisti deBroglie-Bohm theory regards (ψ,Qi) to be the om-
plete speiation of the state of a system, this model onsiders the pair (|ψ〉, n)
(with |ψ〉 being the state vetor).
13
However, Bell aknowledges that this beable hoie is everything but unique (p.179).
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The task is now to nd the proper dynamis for this pair. For the state vetor
the usual evolution
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 =
1
i
H|ψ(t)〉
is onsidered (in the following h¯ is set to 1). Again this gives rise to a ontinuity
equation:
d
dt
Pn =
∑
m
Jnm (8)
with: Pn =
∑
q
|〈n, q|ψ(t)〉|2
Jnm =
∑
q,p
2Re〈ψ(t)|n, q〉〈n, q| − iH|m, p〉〈m, p|ψ(t)〉
Here q and p denote additional quantum numbers suh that e.g. |p, n〉 forms
a basis in Hilbert spae. The n and m in the state speiation denote the
fermion number. Thus Pn is the probability distribution for the fermion number
onguration n. While ordinary quantum mehanis (or quantum eld theory)
views this as the probability to observe the system in this state, Bell views it as
the probability for the system to be in this state. Therefore it is his ambition to
establish an analog to the guidane equation, i.e. to desribe the time evolution
of this beable irrespetively of its being observed or not.
Bell presribes a stohasti evolution
14
for the fermion number with the jump
rate Tnm, i.e. the probability to jump to the onguration n within the time
span dt, given that the present onguration is m, is given by Tnmdt. Clearly the
following equation holds:
dPn
dt
=
∑
m
(TnmPm − TmnPn), (9)
i.e. the hange of Pn in time is given by the jumps m → n diminished by the
jumps n → m. However, Equ.9 must be reoniled with ondition 8, i.e. the
stohasti dynamis needs to obey the ontinuity onstraint. This leads to the
ondition Jnm = TnmPm − TmnPn, whih is for example satised by the hoie:
15
Tnm =
{
Jnm/Pm if Jnm > 0
0 if Jnm ≤ 0
Finally, the probability Tnndt for the system to remain in the same fermion num-
ber onguration is xed by the normalization
∑
m Tmndt = 1. Given an initial
onguration of the fermion number in aordane with Pn(t0) =
∑
q |〈n, q|ψ(t0)〉|
2
this model reprodues all preditions of ordinary quantum eld theory.
16
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Bell expeted the indeterminism to disappear in the ontinuum limit.
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This hoie is not unique, e.g. one may add solutions of the homogeneous equation.
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Bell notes that this inludes also the outome of the Mihelson-Morley experiment, although
this formulation relies on a partiular division of spae-time. Hene the violation of Lorentz
invariane is not detetable (p.179).
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The physial piture is that the world desribes a random walk in the fermion-
number onguration spae; this random walk being biased by the state |ψ(t)〉.
The non-deterministi jump proesses orrespond to the reation and annihilation
of partiles.
Dürr et al. (2004); Dürr et al. (2005) have developed a similar proess in the on-
tinuum for more or less any regularized quantum eld theory and all it Bell-type
quantum eld theories. While their model is ontinuous it still inludes a random
proesses i.e. is non-deterministi. However, work of Colin (2003) suggests that
it is also possible to onstrut a deterministi ontinuum limit. The dierene
between these two ontinuum versions of the Bell-model lies in the treatment of
the vauum. Dürr et al. take it to be the state with no partile-beables. In
ontrast does Colin's model introdue partile beables for every negative energy
solution, i.e. invokes the Dira sea onept. Thereby the onguration spae
beomes innite dimensional, i.e. does not possess a Lebesgue volume measure.
As mentioned before in the ontext of eld-beables this introdues problems for
a rigorous denition of an equivariant measure (Tumulka (2006), p.15).
4.4 Some remarks on theory-generalization
In Se.4.1 we have argued that having beables qualies a theory as Bohm-like.
Further more we have used the expression Bohm-like and generalization of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory synonymously. However, there seem to be reasonable
distintions between these two onepts. In the remainder of that paper we
want to disuss the issue of theory generalization in some more detail. We will
argue that being a generalization of the deBroglie-Bohm theory is atually a
more restritive property than being Bohm-like only. We investigate whether
this may help to single out a andidate from the ompeting models disussed in
the previous setion. However, we will also see that this is ompliated by the
fat that the onept of theory generalization is more involved than usually
onsidered.
Do all Bohm-like models generalize the de Broglie-Bohm theory?
So far we have been disussing Bohm-like QFT or atually beable-QFT. How-
ever, we have already indiated in Se. 4.1, that in order to regard these models
as a generalization of the original theory it is reasonable to demand a spei
relation between the non-relativisti formulation and these models. Very natural
is the requirement that the Bohm-like QFT should inlude the non-relativisti
deBroglie-Bohm theory as a limiting ase. After all, there is no strit boundary
between non-relativisti and relativisti physis and the orresponding theories
should ideally merge to eah other. We want to all this our preliminary riteria
for theory generalization.
Vink (1993), p.1811, investigates the relation between his generalized Bell-model
and the original deBroglie-Bohm theory. He shows that the stohasti dynam-
is leads to the ordinary deBroglie-Bohm theory in the ontinuum limit. His
argument is mathematially not rigorous but given that this model employs a
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partile-ontology from the outset it is ertainly plausible to expet suh a limit
to exist.
The situation seems very dierent when it omes to eld-beables; for example
in the Struyve-Westman model. Given that there the fermioni degrees of free-
dom have no beable status it is not oneivable how to obtain the non-relativisti
formulation as a limiting ase. One may illustrate this with the example of the
hydrogen atom. In the deBroglie-Bohm theory the physial piture of this system
is a partile-beable (assigned to the eletron) distributed aording to |ψ|2. In
the Struyve-Westman model only the radiations degrees of freedom of the eletro-
magneti eld have beable status and the eletron is only an epiphenomenon.
Therefore the Bohm-like QFT à la Struyve and Westman an not be viewed as
a generalization of the ordinary deBroglie-Bohm theory (in the above sense) but
provides a omplete reformulation of the non-relativisti theory.
Thus, the riteria whether a Bohm-like QFT inludes the deBroglie-Bohm theory
as a limiting ase seems to allow an assessment of the dierent models. Rated
by this measure the Bell-type models seem to be superior sine they start with
the same ontology as the non-relativisti formulation from the outset. But do
we really have ompelling arguments to make the non-relativisti formulation the
touhstone for QFT generalizations? One ould also be willing to modify the
non-relativisti deBroglie-Bohm theory (e.g. along the lines skethed above in
the hydrogen example). It seems reasonable to argue that not the non-relativisti
formulation itself but only its preditions need to be reovered.
But there is even another twist in the above argument. Sofar we have employed a
spei onept of theory generalization (the limiting ase relation) and found
that the eld-beable approah has problems to ope with it. However, one may
also ask how natural the requirement of the limiting ase relation atually is. In
fat these and related intertheory relations have been ritially examined within
the philosophy of siene. We will therefore say a few words on this debate and
its possible impat on our question.
What does it mean to generalize a theory?
Within the philosophy of siene this question is part of the study of intertheory
relations (Batterman, 2005) and oers some surprises.
Traditionally this and related questions were framed in the ontext of redu-
tive relations between theories, i.e. the question whether a given theory T1 (the
primary theory) redues to T2 (the seondary theory).
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In some sense theory
generalization is the inverse operation to theory redution. An early and in-
uential treatment of theory redution was given by Nagel (1961) (Chapter 11)
who viewed theory redution essentially as a relation of dedution, i.e. the laws
of the seondary theory should be derivable from the laws of the primary theory.
However, this typially requires a translation of the desriptive terms of T2 whih
are absent in T1 into the T1-language (so-alled bridge priniples).
17
Here we take redution to be the move from the general (i.e. more fundamental) to the
spei. In the philosophial literature it is often regarded the other way around.
18
In reply to ritiism against the highly idealized piture of the Nagelian aount
more sophistiated models of redution have been developed (e.g. Shaner (1967);
Shaner (1969); Nikles (1973) and Hooker (1981)). Our above disussion used
the notion, that a theory, T1, redues to an other, T2, if T2 is obtained as a limiting
ase, i.e. if there is a parameter, say ǫ, in the primary theory suh that the laws
of the seondary theory are obtained in the limit ǫ→ 0. This is a modiation of
the Nagelian aount due to Nikles (1973). The textbook example is the relation
between speial relativity and lassial mehanis in the limit (v/c)2 → 0.
However, it has been shown that this notion of redution an not aount for
many relevant ases. For example the mathematial physiists Sir Mihael Berry
noted with respet to this example, that
(...) this simple state of aairs is an exeptional situation. Usually,
limits of physial theories are not analyti: they are singular, and the
emergent phenomena assoiated with redution are ontained in the
singularity. (Berry (1994), p.599)
In suh ases there is no smooth redution relation between the orresponding
theories, i.e. the seondary theory an neither be derived from the primary theory
nor obtained as a limiting ase, sine the limit simply does not exist.
18
Examples
investigated by Berry are the relation between wave and ray optis or quantum
and lassial mehanis.
19
In fat the lassial limit of quantummehanis belongs
to the open foundational questions of the theory (see Landsman (2005) for an
exellent overview).
Thus, there are many relevant ases in physis whih intuitively ount as theory
generalization but fail to satisfy the limiting-ase relation. If one is not willing
to loose these ases one an not require this ondition.
With respet to the relation between higher level and lower level (i.e. more
fundamental) theories some authors argue for a relation alled emergene. The
dierent versions of emergene roughly share the idea that emergent entities
(properties or substane) `arise' out of more fundamental entities and yet are
`novel' or `irreduible' with respet to them (O'Connor/Wong, 2002). Another
way to haraterize emergene is simply by a denial of redution (R-emergene)
or a denial of superveniene
20
(S-emergene) (see Howard (2003), p.3).
18
A simple example of a singular limit is given by Batterman (2005). The equation x2ǫ +
x− 9 = 0 has two roots for any value of ǫ > 0 but only one solution for the ǫ = 0 ase. Thus,
the harater of the behavior in the ase ǫ = 0 diers fundamentally from the harater of its
limiting (i.e. ǫ small but nite) behavior.
19
Interestingly this is not taken as evidene against redution per se. Berry states, that what
follows should not be misonstrued as antiredutionist. On the ontrary, I am rmly of the view
[...℄ that all the sienes are ompatible and that details links an be, and are being, forged
between them. But of ourse the links are subtle [...℄ (Berry (2001), p.4).
20
Superveniene may be haraterized as an onti relation between strutures, i.e. sets of
entities together with properties and relations among them. A struture SA is said to supervene
on an other, say SB, if the A-entities are omposed of B-entities and the properties and relations
of SA are determined by properties and relations of SB. It should be noted that neither does
redution entails superveniene nor the other way around.
19
However, if one denies the possibility to redue a theory from a more fundamental
level, the inverse move (i.e. the theory generalization) is aeted as well. In what
sense should a theory T1 be regarded as a generalization of (i.e. being more
fundamental than) a theory T2 if it is not possible to reover T2 from T1? The
whole talk about higher level, lower level or being more fundamental beomes
void and one seems to be left over with autonomous theories.
These brief remarks shall indiate that the onept of a theory generalization is
more involved than usually onsidered (at least in the physis ommunity). Thus,
the failure of e.g. Bohm-like QFT with eld-beables to reover the ordinary
deBroglie-Bohm theory as a limiting ase may be viewed rather as a generi
feature in the relation between higher and lower level theories and not as a
reason to rejet this model.
It might still be possible to justify a ertain beable hoie based on the riteria that
the relation between the orresponding Bohm-like QFT and the non-relativisti
deBroglie-Bohm theory has desirable properties. However, this needs a more
rened denition of theory generalization. It seems very promising to investigate
the Bohm-like quantum eld theories as ase studies for intertheory relations in
order to learn more about both, theory generalization in general and the de
Broglie-Bohm-program in partiular.
5 Summary and onlusion
The non-relativisti deBroglie-Bohm theory is able to give an observer indepen-
dent aount of all quantum phenomena. It solves the infamous measurement
problem, or, to be more preise, there is no suh problem in the deBroglie-Bohm
theory. It serves as a ounter example to the ommon laim that no desrip-
tion of quantum phenomena an be given whih employs partiles moving on
ontinuous trajetories. However, like most alternative interpretations it is not
experimentally distinguishable from standard quantum mehanis.
When it omes to relativisti and quantum eld theoretial generalizations one
rst needs to agree upon what one atually means by a Bohm-like theory.
Seemingly a theory needs to have deterministi trajetories to ount as Bohm-
like. However, most Bohmians would suggest that the deisive property of the
deBroglie-Bohm theory is that it attributes a beable-status to ertain proper-
ties. As long as these beables provide the means to reord measurement outomes
they an be used to build a Bohm-like model. Partile beables are just a spei
example for this strategy. For relativisti and quantum eld theoretial general-
izations several ompeting models do exist. These display a surprising exibility
with respet to the beable-hoie. Some models stik to a partile ontology
while others introdue eld-beables. Further more there is no need to introdue
beables for all partile speies and e.g. the Struyve-Westman model does without
a beable status for fermions.
21
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The question whether all partiles (should) have beable status is also addressed in
Goldstein et al. (2005).
20
A further investigation of the relation between these dierent models and the
original deBroglie-Bohm theory seems to be an interesting ase-study for what
has been alled intertheory relations in the philosophy of siene. Possibly an
assessment of these models ould be based on the result.
Be that as it may, the ommon laim that the deBroglie-Bohm theory is inom-
patible with quantum eld theory is ertainly inorret. Agreed, all these models
have a ooked-up avor, but this is due to the fat that their task is (in gen-
eral) to reprodue the preditions of existing theories. These existing theories
work FAPP (for all pratial purposes) and the ambition of Bohm-like reformu-
lations is not to extend their preditive power but to put them on a oneptually
rm basis.
Now, does this mean that every physiist should be a Bohmian? Certainly not.
But those who rejet this possible quantum world should use orret arguments.
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